Wednesday, December 5, 2007

Minnesota state troopers have authority to stop and arrest individuals anywhere in the state

STATE OF MINNESOTA, IN COURT OF APPEALS, A07-0914:

Thomas William Westby, petitioner, Respondent, vs. Commissioner of Public Safety, Appellant; Filed December 4, 2007:

A Minnesota State Patrol trooper was on County Road 7 in Cook County when he noticed a vehicle stopped at a stop sign on County Road 15. The trooper followed the vehicle and noticed respondent weaving within the lane of traffic and driving briefly over the fog line onto the gravel shoulder of the Gunflint Trail.

The trooper stopped the vehicle. The stop led to arrrest for DWI and the defendant's license was revoked under Minnesota's implied-consent law.

After an implied-consent hearing the judge revoked the revocation of the defendant's license, holding:

“[t]here is no authority . . . for troopers to take it upon themselves to decide when and under what circumstances to patrol city streets, county or township roads, or, indeed which streets or roads to patrol beyond state Trunk Highways.”
The State appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. The argument centered around two statutes. Minn. Stat. § 299D.03, subd. 1(b)(1), (7) (2006), states that members of theMinnesota State Patrol are permitted to “enforce the provisions of the law relating to the protection of and use of trunk highways” and to “exercise upon all trunk highways the same powers with respect to the enforcement of laws relating to crimes, as sheriffs and police officers.”

The other statute, Section 299D.03, subdivision 1(b)(12), provides that Minnesota State Patrol troopers shall have the power and authority “as peace officers to make arrests for public offenses committed in their presence anywhere within the state. Persons arrested for violations other than traffic violations shall be referred forthwith to the appropriate local law enforcement agency for further investigation or disposition.”

The defendant/Respondent argued that to give meaning to subdivision 1(b)(12) would be to “render[] the first portions of the statute a nullity—completely superfluous.”

The court disagreed and held:
Under subsections 1(b)(1) and (7) of section 299D.03, the subsections which most closely resemble 1(b)(12), troopers have the authority to enforce both traffic and criminal laws on state trunk highways. But these subsections are readily distinguishable from 1(b)(12), which allows state troopers to arrest anywhere in the state but limits that power to public offenses committed in his or her presence. We conclude that subdivision 1(b)(12) is not duplicative.
Based on this, the court held that the "statutory language specifically states that a trooper can arrest a person for a public offense 'anywhere within the state,' the only limit being that the offense occur in the state trooper’s presence."