Does Failure to Disclose DNA Test Results Constitute Manifest Injustice?

State vs. Bryson, filed June 24, 2008

On September 23, 2005, Appellant, Rafael Bryson, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. Prior to pleading guilty, the prosecution notified the Appellant that the police had recovered a gun from the roof of a building that Appellant had run past when police were pursuing him; and that, according to forensic testing, the bullet casings found near the victim's body showed that the casings were fired by the gun retrieved on the rooftop; that the gun could not be eliminated as the gun that fired the three bullets removed from the victim's body; and that, according to forensic testing, gun-shot residue was found on the right sleeve of the shirt Appellant was allegedly wearing at the time of the shooting. After receiving this information, Appellant pleaded guilty.

In July 2005, State had requested and received a continuance to allow for forensic testing of additional evidence collected from under the victim's fingernails and Appellant's clothing. This information was apparently not received by the prosecutor's office prior to entry of Appellant's guilty plea.

In March 2006, Appellant filed notice of appeal. The appellate court stayed the proceedings and remanded the case to district court for postconviction proceedings. In district court, Appellant filed a postconviction motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea.

The day before the hearing was scheduled on Appellant's postconviction motion, the prosecution received reports from the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension detailing additional forensic test results. The reports indicated that the Appellant's DNA was not found under the victim's fingernails and that no blood was found on the stained shirt allegedly worn by Appellant. This report was dated August 17, 2005, more than a month before Appellant pleaded guilty.

The Court of Appeals has remanded this case to the postconviction court for determination of whether the State's failure to disclose these BCA reports constituted a manifest injustice, i.e. whether it prevented the Appellant from entering an accurate, voluntary and intelligent plea. Also at play is the prosecutor's obligation to disclose all exculpatory material within his "possession and control."

Stay tuned.

Another Wrong Place/Wrong Time Story

Here:

Last Dec. 29 Blake Shamar Officer, a 17-year-old African-American, was on his way home from work at a local sandwich shop when he stumbled onto a crime scene in South Minneapolis. A middle-aged Latino man had been shot nonfatally during a robbery in front of an apartment building at Pillsbury and 28th avenues south. As Blake happened by, he caught the attention of police officers who believed the tall teen-ager matched the victim’s physical description of the shooter. After officers questioned him, the innocent yet nervous teen-ager was arrested, charged with four felonies and placed on house arrest. In a kind of legal limbo, he waited several months before charges against him were finally dropped.

And if we needed more evidence refuting the accuracy of witness identifications:

The alleged shooter was African-American, dressed in all black, and somewhere between 5 feet 8 and 5 feet 10. Despite the fact that Blake was wearing a gold shirt and stands 6 feet 5, the victim twice positively identified Blake as the culprit.

Is a Kick to the Groin Reasonable?

The D.C. Circuit Court says no.

The relevant facts of the case:

Juan Johnson is a police officer whose off-duty act of kindness to a stranger in distress landed him in the middle of a drug bust in which he was repeatedly kicked in the groin by a police officer who mistook him for a criminal. Johnson claims he was a victim of police brutality and sues both the officer alleged to have kicked him and the District of Columbia.

The court reasoned that "a reasonable officer would not have repeatedly kicked the surrendering suspect in the groin." Wow. Really? This is one of those rare situations which does not involve a suspect's word versus the word of an officer. In this case it is the officer's word versus another officer's word. Where would this case be if it had been the suspect's word vs. officer's word? I imagine it would not have gotten this far. The officer would have said the suspect was fleeing and resisting and...case closed.

Don't Talk to Cops, Part 2

The cop side of the story. The defense attorney/law professor, of course, is right. Don't ever talk to cops.

Don't Talk to Cops, Part 1