Drug Evidence Suppressed When Incriminating Nature Not "Immediately Apparent"

STATE OF MINNESOTA,COURT OF APPEALS A06-1226; State of Minnesota vs. Monica Mae Peterson, Filed November 27, 2007:

The Minneapolis Police Department received a tip that the subject of an outstanding felony warrant was staying at a Minneapolis residence. Officers exexcute the warrant and found the individual cited in the warrant as well as the Defendant.

Although the officers had successfully executed their arrest warrant, they did not immediately leave the home. Instead, they asked the Defendant for identification. Defendant initially claimed not to have any ID with her.

The officers told Defendant that she had to leave the house, and she responded that she would need some time to get her three children ready to come with her. One of the officers told her to get out of bed, and she nodded, but did not promptly get up.

The Defendant eventually got off the bed and proceeded to attempt to leave the room. As she was leaving a female officer stopped her and started to conduct a pat frisk. The officer testified that she “wanted to pat search her before we let her walk around the basement . . . [i]n case she had a weapon on her or anything. And there was something not right, that she wouldn’t get out of the bed right away.”

The officer testified that she knew that the object she felt was not a weapon. She thought the objects might be drugs, and continued the search because she thought the Defendant might be "hiding something". The officer grabbed appellant’s arm and pressed her against the wall to handcuff her. Then the officer removed the contents of appellant’s pockets, which included methamphetamine.

The court of appeals suppressed the contents of the search first citing the rule in Terry v. Ohio:

A Terry search is strictly limited to one that may discover weapons. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, “[i]f the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be suppressed.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993). Should a lawful Terry frisk reveal the possession of an item whose incriminating character is “immediately apparent,” the seizure of that item is proper under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 375, 113 S. Ct. at 2137. In cases when the police officer testifies that he or she immediately identified an item as contraband without any further manipulation, the seizure of the item does not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Burton, 556 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 1997).

As applied to the facts in this case, the court held:

Unless the officer could plainly recognize that the hard objects in appellant’s pocket were contraband, further manipulation or seizure of them was impermissible under Dickerson and Burton. The officer testified that she was immediately certain that the objects she felt in the appellant’s pocket were not a weapon. The officer further testified that she was not sure but thought the objects might be drugs and continued the search because she suspected that the appellant was “hiding something.” This is too tenuous. There is no end of innocent, hard objects that may be in people’s pockets. Appellant was a bystander at Payette’s arrest. Because the search went further than what was required to assure that the appellant was not armed and because the officer could not immediately identify the contraband as such through “plain feel,” the evidence of methamphetamine is the fruit of an illegal search and should have been suppressed under Dickerson.

"Bodily Harm" = "A Little Pain"

STATE OF MINNESOTA, IN COURT OF APPEALS, A06-1706; State of Minnesota vs. Andrew Sookhar.

Defendant appealed his convictions of first-degree aggravated robbery and felony domestic assault, arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s determination that the victim suffered bodily harm, which is an element of each offense.

Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery and domestic assault after he struck his girlfriend (the victim) on the left side of her face and grabbed her cellular telephone. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.245 (aggravated robbery), .2242, subd. 4 (felony domestic assault) (2004). “Bodily harm,” as used in the aggravated-robbery and domestic-assault statutes, means “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2004). At trial, the victim testified that the blow “hurt a little.” The victim did not suffer any discoloration, bruising, or injury.

The Defendant argued that "bodily harm" must be more than "a little pain".

The court disagreed and held:

Under the plain language of section 609.02, subdivision 7, pain alone is sufficient to constitute bodily harm, and the fact that the pain involved in cases cited by Sookhar was greater than the pain testified to by the victim in this case is irrelevant. The victim’s testimony in this case is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Sookhar inflicted bodily harm.

Vehicle Entering Intersection On Yellow Traffic Light Not A Basis For A Stop

STATE OF MINNESOTA, COURT OF APPEALS, A06-2052: State of Minnesota vs. Justin Allen Kilmer, Filed November 20, 2007:

Defendant was stopped by an officer after he entered into an intersection when the controlling traffic light was yellow. The stop led to the Defendant being charged with DWI.

The Defendant contested the validity of the stop and argued that the controlling statute did not prohibit a vehicle from entered an intersection on a yellow light. Based on this, he argued, he committed no offense and there was no legal basis for the stop.

The district court held that Minnesota law prohibits drivers from entering an intersection when a traffic light is yellow, and on this basis found the stop legal.

The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the applicable statute Minn. Stat. § 169.06, subd. 5(a)(2)(i) (Supp. 2005), which provides that “[v]ehicular traffic facing a circular yellow signal is thereby warned that the related green movement is being terminated or that a red indication will be exhibited immediately thereafter when vehicular traffic must not enter the intersection . . . .”, does not prohibit a vehicle from entering the intersection on a yellow light.

The court held that the language merely discloses the meaning and the advisory-warning nature of the yellow signal. Because the court found no legal basis for the stop the court reversed the DWI and test refusal convictions resulting from the evidence obtained as a result of the stop.

Multiple Traffic Violations Allow Expansion of Search To Vehicle

STATE OF MINNESOTA, IN COURT OF APPEALS, A06-1149: State of Minnesota v. Schnaut Deante Currie, Filed November 13, 2007:

Police initially stopped the Defendant because of several traffic violations. Three officers testified that they directed a spotlight on appellant’s vehicle as they pulled it over, and they observed him make movements that suggested he was either concealing something or removing something from a hiding place. Based on the traffic violations and the observations, the police conducted a search of the vehicle and found a firearm. The Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subds. 1(b), 2(b) (2004). The Defendant appealed and argued that the district court erred by refusing to suppress evidence discovered during a warrantless search of his automobile.

The United States Supreme Court has determined that an individual committing even a minor criminal offense in the presence of an officer may be arrested and searched. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557 (2001).

In Minnesota, however, the courts have construed the Minnesota Constitution as affording greater protection than the U.S. Constitution. In Minnesota, “the scope and duration of a traffic stop investigation must be limited to the justification for the stop.” State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn. 2003). Each expansion of a stop beyond the original purpose must be justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of additional criminal activity. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d at 488. An exception to this general rule is that:

[a] protective search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the officer possesses a reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon. State v. Waddell, 655 N.W.2d 803, 810 (Minn. 2003).

In this case, the initial stop was based on traffic violations, which would normally limit any search to effectuating the purpose of the original stop. However, the court found two justifications for the police to search the vehicle.

First, the court held that this situation differs from minor driving violation in Askerooth. In this case "police observed an escalating series of traffic violations, including equipment violations, failing to signal a turn, driving at 50 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour-zone, failing to stop at two stop signs, and accelerating over speed bumps. This conduct is more serious than a minor driving violation. Cf. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. 1997) (noting that “very few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance without violating some traffic regulation”). Thus, the number of violations raised a heightened degree of suspicion in the officers observing the conduct."

Second, because the police initially noticed the Defendant making movements during the initial stop, the court held that:

This conduct supports their decision to remove appellant and his passengers from the car, frisk them, and place them in squad cars or handcuff them. This conduct also supports their reasonable suspicion that the vehicle could contain weapons or contraband, permitting them to search the car in the interest of officer safety.

Based on this, the court affirmed the decision of the district court and held that police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity that permitted expansion of the search beyond the initial stop.

Failure to Signal Turn Provides Sufficient Cause For Stop

State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Scott Fasteen:

On November 5, 2006, a patrol officer clocked a pickup traveling 39 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone. The officer followed the vehicle driven by the Defendant. After the Defendant turned left onto a side road without using his turn signal, the officer stopped the vehicle. The officer performed field sobriety tests on the Defendant and ultimately arrested him for driving under the influence and subsequently charged and convicted of the offense.

Prior to pleading guilty the Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence, alleging that the officer did not have sufficient cause to make the intial stop of his vehicle for failing to signal his turn.

The district court denied the motion to suppress and the Defendant entered into a conditional guilty plea and reserved the issue of the stop for appeal.

The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the district court decision and held:

The arresting officer in this case made an investigative stop of Fasteen's vehicle after observing Fasteen make a left-hand turn without signaling. Under N.D.C.C. § 39-10-38:

1. No person may turn a vehicle or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety without giving an appropriate signal in the manner hereinafter provided.

2. A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required must be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet [30.48 meters] traveled by the vehicle before turning.

The Defendant contended that the language "when required" in statute allowed a driver to make a turn without signaling if it was safe to do so. The court rejected this argument and held that a driver must signal prior to making a turn and can only make a turn when it is safe to do so. Based on this the court held that the minor violation of law was sufficient to justify the stop.